For over half a century, the promise of Liberian oil has functioned more as a mirage than a catalyst for national development. Since the first tentative exploration efforts in 1969, the narrative has remained depressingly consistent: a recurring cycle of data sales, grandiose ministerial announcements, and the ephemeral hope of sudden wealth. Yet, despite decades of technical assessment and international interest, not a single drop of commercial oil has been extracted. Instead, Liberia has become a theater for a high-stakes carousel of maneuvering, where opaque deals and institutional secrecy have consistently prioritized the enrichment of a well-connected elite over the transformative potential of the state.
The latest machinations surrounding the offshore sector suggest that the ghost of the past has not only returned but is actively shaping the future of the nation’s energy governance. The recent decision by President Joseph Boakai’s administration to bypass statutory regulatory frameworks and grant 100 percent ownership of four offshore oil blocks—LB-10, LB-11, LB-29, and LB-31—to the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL) represents a jarring departure from the principles of transparency and fiscal responsibility. By side-stepping the Liberia Petroleum Regulatory Authority (LPRA) and avoiding both legislative oversight and robust stakeholder consultation, the Executive branch has effectively bypassed the very safeguards intended to protect Liberia’s patrimony. Under the Amended Petroleum Law of 2019, the architecture of block allocation is predicated on a rigid, transparent process: prospective partners must undergo rigorous pre-qualification through the LPRA, and the mechanism for award is fundamentally rooted in competitive, open-market bidding.
These measures were not merely bureaucratic hurdles; they were hard-won lessons derived from decades of mismanagement, designed to prevent the ‘middleman’ economy that has historically hollowed out the sector. The Executive’s justification—that such consolidation simplifies processes for investors and mitigates legislative bottlenecks—rings hollow to those familiar with the history of the industry. NOCAL, for its part, has framed this unprecedented centralization of assets as a ‘transformative step,’ pledging that the move will yield maximum financial dividends, spur job creation, and solidify national energy security. Yet, this optimistic rhetoric ignores a fundamental economic reality: NOCAL is a state-owned entity currently lacking the technical infrastructure, financial capital, and operational independence required to manage deepwater exploration.
Critics and independent energy analysts argue that the arrangement is not designed for exploration, but for extraction—of the rent-seeking variety. A senior sector expert, speaking on condition of anonymity, provided a scathing assessment: ‘NOCAL does not have the financial or technical capacity to drill or operate an oil block. The endgame here is clearly to hold these assets in a state of purgatory until they can be flipped to private international interests. This is not about energy independence; it is about creating a middleman entity that serves as a vehicle for asset-flipping.
’ In this context, the resurgence of Prince Arthur Eze is perhaps the most concerning development. The Nigerian oil tycoon’s name has become synonymous with the darkest chapters of Liberia’s resource management. His historical business model—a masterclass in predatory speculation—is well-documented. Following the cessation of hostilities after the civil war, Eze secured control of three offshore blocks for a nominal investment of approximately $200,000.
Through a series of rapid-fire corporate maneuvers, he eventually sold these assets to Chevron for a staggering $250 million, securing a profit of nearly $200 million while leaving Liberia with no infrastructure and no sustainable development gains. International watchdogs, including Global Witness, have previously highlighted the irregularities of such transactions, noting that these windfall profits were reportedly facilitated by questionable relationships with local legislative figures. Now, fourteen years after his last major exit from the Liberian stage, Eze has resurfaced, positioning himself for potential control over blocks 15, 16, 22, and 24. This return is not occurring in a vacuum.
Investigative leads suggest that his reentry has been meticulously facilitated by a powerful cohort surrounding President Boakai. Sources point to an inner circle that includes Joseph ‘Joejoe’ Boakai Jr., the president’s son; Walter S. McCarty; Jacob Kabakollie, a former NOCAL executive; and Dr.
Christopher Neyor, a veteran of the sector who has long been a fixture in Liberia’s oil politics. This group is alleged to have orchestrated high-level access for Eze, including sensitive private audiences with the President at a time when the sector is ostensibly undergoing a competitive bid round. The optics of such a meeting are inherently toxic. When an interested party is granted direct access to the Head of State during an active, sensitive tender process, the integrity of the procurement is fundamentally compromised.
Even if, as some supporters claim, the President has resisted immediate demands for side-deals, the mere existence of these meetings sends a chilling signal to international investors. Serious, reputable multinational corporations—the ones that possess the actual capacity for deepwater drilling—operate with strict compliance standards. For firms like ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, or Chevron, the perception of a ‘pay-to-play’ environment is a deterrent. If the process is rigged or perceived as being under the thumb of politically exposed persons, the credible players retreat, leaving the field open only to the speculators and middlemen who profit from corruption.
The consequences of these procedural breaches extend far beyond the immediate loss of a fair bidding process. Liberia’s credibility as an emerging hydrocarbon player is fragile; it is built on the hope that the country has finally learned the lessons of the past. If the state demonstrates a willingness to discard its own laws to accommodate favored individuals, the risk of legal challenges becomes significant. Furthermore, the international investment community is increasingly sensitive to ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) criteria.
A government that bypasses its own regulatory authority invites intense scrutiny, potential litigation, and, in extreme cases, international sanctions that could permanently blacklist Liberia’s petroleum sector. The demand from civil society, opposition leaders, and economic watchdogs is clear: the government must reverse these unilateral allocations, restore the primacy of the LPRA, and ensure that any future award of blocks is conducted through a public, transparent, and competitive process. The current trajectory suggests an administration prioritizing short-term patronage over long-term prosperity. As the international community monitors these developments, the Boakai administration stands at a crossroads.
It can either solidify its legacy by upholding the rule of law and insulating the energy sector from the influence of political brokers, or it can allow the ghosts of the past to dictate the future. The choice will determine whether Liberia remains a cautionary tale of resource exploitation or finally moves toward a model of accountable, state-led development. The time for maneuvering is over; the time for transparency is long overdue.
