No Debate: IRISE Secondary School Project Began and Finished Under Weah, Says Ex-Deputy Minister Kessely

In the complex arena of Liberian political history, where credit for national development projects is often fiercely contested, former Deputy Minister for Planning, Research, and Development, Alton Kessely, has stepped into the spotlight to assert a definitive narrative. As a key architect of the Improving Results in Secondary Education (IRISE) Project, Kessely is challenging the revisionist historical accounts that attempt to distribute credit for the project’s success to the preceding administration of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. With an authoritative stance, Kessely asserts that IRISE was conceptualized, launched, negotiated, and fully delivered under the administration of President George Manneh Weah. He dares any critic or political opponent to produce documentation that would prove otherwise, arguing that the records speak for themselves.

To understand the gravity of Kessely’s assertion, one must place the IRISE project within the broader context of Liberia’s post-conflict educational landscape. Following the civil war, the Liberian education sector was described by former President Sirleaf as a 'mess,' a characterization that prompted various, often disjointed, attempts at reform. Among these was the Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL) initiative, championed by former Education Minister George Werner. The PSL program was an experimental, controversial move to outsource the management of public primary schools to private entities and NGOs. While PSL dominated the headlines between 2016 and 2018, Kessely emphasizes that it was fundamentally distinct from IRISE. The PSL was a primary-level intervention focused on operational management, whereas IRISE was a strategic, systemic, and multi-year investment specifically targeting the secondary education pipeline. Kessely clarifies that requests to leverage $25 million in World Bank funding for secondary schooling during the Sirleaf era never crystallized into a formal, funded project, rendering any claim of continuity between the two programs factually incorrect.

Furthermore, while the 'Getting to Best' Education Sector Plan (2017–2021) provided a roadmap for reforms, it remained largely a conceptual framework rather than an engine for large-scale infrastructure and policy implementation in the secondary education sector. It was only after the global landscape shifted in 2018 with the World Bank’s introduction of the Human Capital Project that the necessary institutional conditions for a project like IRISE were met. This global policy pivot allowed the Weah administration to effectively secure the backing required to launch a transformative, long-term program. Kessely and his team at the Ministry of Education seized this opportunity, moving quickly to identify, prepare, and negotiate the terms of the IRISE project. For Kessely, the transition from the 'Getting to Best' rhetoric to the tangible, brick-and-mortar reality of IRISE represents a clear delineation between two distinct administrative eras.

When Kessely declares that the IRISE project was taken 'from inception to implementation' under President Weah, he is highlighting a transition from fragmented pilot programs to a centralized, sustainable educational strategy. The IRISE initiative, valued at approximately $47 million, was never merely about building school houses; it involved comprehensive reforms, including teacher training, curriculum updates, and the implementation of grants to schools to ensure they remained functional and effective. These outcomes were achieved through intense, multi-year negotiations with international stakeholders, which Kessely maintains took place exclusively during his tenure under the Weah government. The claim that the project began during the Sirleaf years lacks supporting evidence because the necessary legal, financial, and procedural frameworks were only activated after the 2018 policy change.

Beyond the mere timeline of events, there is an important economic and social implication to Kessely’s stance. In a developing nation like Liberia, infrastructure projects are often the primary metrics by which the public evaluates the efficacy of a government. By asserting control over the IRISE legacy, Kessely is defending the administrative competence of the Weah government. He argues that by ignoring the specific labor, diplomatic effort, and technical planning required to pull a project from the drawing board to completion, critics are attempting to strip the Weah administration of its primary achievements. He insists that there is no ambiguity: the records held by the Ministry of Education, the official IRISE Grant Manual, and the project documentation archived by the World Bank all anchor the inception of the program firmly in the 2018–2025 window.

The regional context also underscores why this project is so critical. Education systems across West Africa have struggled with the 'secondary school bottleneck,' where many students drop out of the system after primary school due to a lack of available secondary options or the poor quality of existing facilities. IRISE was designed specifically to tackle this bottleneck in Liberia. The delivery of new, modern secondary schools in rural areas, equipped with the necessary learning materials, represents a significant leap forward in regional educational benchmarks. Kessely maintains that this, along with the project's extensions through 2025, constitutes a success story that defines the Weah administration’s commitment to human capital development. The project is not just a legacy of his own professional career as a civil servant; it is a point of contention in the broader debate regarding who set the foundation for Liberia’s modern development.

Kessely’s challenge is not just an appeal to the archives; it is a demand for intellectual honesty in Liberian political discourse. By stating, 'If anyone claims the IRISE project started under the Sirleaf administration, let them produce a document to prove it,' he is signaling a shift toward evidence-based policy analysis in a country where oral tradition and political rhetoric often overwrite historical facts. He points to the World Bank project statements and the specific procurement milestones, which provide a clear audit trail. He emphasizes that previous efforts, while perhaps well-intentioned, were localized and lacked the structural reach that IRISE achieved under the Weah leadership. The confusion, he suggests, may stem from an incomplete understanding of how international development grants move through a multi-year life cycle, from conceptualization to the final disbursements.

Ultimately, the dispute over IRISE speaks to the high stakes of legacy-building in Liberia. As the nation continues to navigate post-war economic challenges, the success of the secondary education sector remains paramount. If, as Kessely asserts, the project began and ended under the Weah administration, then the policies that facilitated it must be understood as the result of a specific administrative approach to human capital investment. Kessely remains firm: he stands by his record, confident that any objective, neutral review of the documentation will confirm that the Weah administration was the sole architect and deliverer of the IRISE project. He believes that the public deserves to know the truth about which policies and administrative efforts actually produced results, and he remains ready to defend his claim against any competing narrative that relies on sentiment rather than cold, hard, documented fact.